Introduction
Following meditations are dedicated
to Prof. Étienne Klein and his works in philosophy of time and
philosophy of science. They are written in first person, in letter
form and shall help to exchange ideas and clear misunderstandings or
discover overlapping points. It is important to me, to make clear
here, that this short meditations are not thought as a critic.
Rather, I have to admit, that I almost agree with all points of Prof.
Klein and are immensely happy to have known about his work. My hope
is to learn more from Prof. Klein in order to bring my own questions
further. Where the tone seems too direct or too critical, this is due
to my limited time for this work. For this reason, these meditations
are neither to be published nor cited.
I thank Dr. Le Duigou for having
contacted me and introduced me to Prof. Klein.
After the recent and unfortunate,
most sad events in Oslo, the discussion of my short work here seems
not appropriate. Nevertheless, understanding its dynamics could help
to avoid even worse events. At least, this I hope.
Between continuance and rupture
Dear Prof. Klein,
Currently, in my doctoral
dissertation in diplomacy, I analyse some of the autobiographies of
the leaders during the September Revolution 1839 (Züriputsch),
written short after the event. Most of these documents were published
under a title like “my portion” or “my view”. As such, my
research is part of revolution theories. The key question I follow is
how they defined a border between liberty and violence. When was from
their subjective view an act a spontaneous act and when was it
considered a violent act which later, consequently, had to be
justified in their autobiography. On the other side, I want to learn
more from the text about their perception of violence as a challenge,
something expected, on one hand, and as the ominous, not
understandable, rupture comprised under the term of – crisis. I
believe from my own experience that rupture – in form of violence,
shock, opposition, power, limitation, or similar – is a necessary
phenomenon in individual process for identity building. This gives
rupture a positive note. Certainly, there is a limit in rupture which
can make identity break up. Time is a background phenomenon linked to
identity. I am inclined to see both as a spontaneous creation of the
individual, but not necessarily limited to human persons, but to any
form of identity. This idea came first to me, when I found the
unavoidable errors in codes in computer science (I have a training in
programming) which are also present in other forms of coding,
especially in DNA structure. There, it has a double function, it is
part of the living, i.e. evolutionary activity, and it makes the code
safer! Little brakes make it almost indestructible over time. The
study of Francis Bacon led me, later, to Hamilton-Paths and in
concrete to the Gray-Code as an “error correcting” code. Since
then, my approach in peace theories and revolution theories
drastically changed. Long time, I was not sure if I want to learn
more about peace, war or revolution. Now, I believe it is all part of
one phenomenon – identity building of individuals and constituency
of societies, where the individual and the social phenomena are
directly related, even though not necessarily in causal terms.
Revolutions, under this point of view, would be a Gray-Code for
society. Any intent of politicians to avoid or deter them must fail
or even worsen the outcome. The question for the politician would
rather be, if there is any form to control the process and realize
revolutions in a way that is the less possible damaging. We would
rather call them social evolution instead. An equivalent for
individual experience is known to be quite successful. Most
indigenous cultures have some sort of initiation ritual for young
children during their transgression towards adulthood. Could there
not be some ritual or principle that helps societies to adapt to
changes throughout time without breaking up? I believe there is a
positive answer to this question, but not under the circumstances
politics is developed nowadays. Similar to medicine, where we can
cure more and more illnesses but have rather more medical cases than
before, or pharmaceutics and aesthetic surgery which can make us look
longer young, but never cure death, in political science, we are very
much concentrated in power building and maintaining power without
understanding the context in which power is developed and executed.
From my own scientific background in
social science, I looked at several of your papers and conferences. I
red “New Questions for Science” which you published in France
Diplomatie in 2008, both in French and English, “Sciences et
humanités: Des Jambes a articular” another internet publications
in French publisched 2008, further “Une nouvelle prévue du
caractère quantique du monde » a podcast at the CEA in 2010
and “Le temps exist-il” a conference held in the framework of
Cyclope 2006 at the CEA. I will pose some questions on each of these
works with the hope to understand your view as a physician
specialized in quantum science and questions of time better. Perhaps,
as you propose, there are not only common questions between science
and humanities but also common answers, if there are any at all.
New Questions for Science
In this paper you directly address
power with its key role in progress. How this progress is measured,
is still an open question to me. But that there is a form of
evolution is acceptable for me. You mention “disasters caused by
Mother Nature” and that the fear of a “cataclysm” that raises
“ethical questions… as part of the scientific process”.
In my view, no modern philosopher
has better addressed the problem of violence in relation to progress
and identity than Slavoj Žižek when he speaks about the nightmare
of Universe (alptraumhafte Universum) in his book “The Ticklish
Subject. The Absent Center of Political Ontology” [CITATION Žiž99 \p 76 \l 2055 ]
and believes that liberty itself is eternal, i.e. beyond time. The
violence or rupture that is caused by the ominous is required for a
“minimal of ontological consistency in reality” and makes
time-bound existences in the original chaos possible (p. 62). It
would go too far to discuss here Žižek’s complete comparison
between Kant and Heidegger’s reading of Kant. Žižek as a
Neo-Marxist and Neo-Hegelian bases his theories very much on Lacanian
psychoanalysis. At the far other extreme lies Hans Hermann-Hoppe, a
libertarian anarchist or anarchocapitalist, who equally starts from
Kant, when he defends his point of a “self-evident” revelation of
rights in the constituency of identity on which he bases property
rights as irrefutable. In both political theories, the liberal
anarchism and the communist anarchism, identity building and
revolution theory play a major role and are directly linked. These
are modern alternatives to the classical approach in Enlightment
theories of free will, purposeful actions, civil rights and policy as
developed by Hobbes and Locke. We find the question of identity also
in their scripts, but for obvious reasons, in modern classical
approaches or mainstream politics, identity has become a very
superficial term. I am aware, that this, my statement, requires
further explanations, which I have to leave for later. The point here
is that their revolutions are generally explained with lack of
democracy or weak rights and are interpreted as a sort of “sign of
weakness ”or“ societal failure with a function of “prerogative”
or defence of rights. Rights are understood as pre-existent in their
theory.
When you, Prof. Klein, mention that
today science has to “prove” both “value and validity” of its
progress you relate it to concepts of happiness, poverty and evil.
This view is supported by a large bibliography in social science and
moral philosophy claiming that we have not achieved the related
goals, despite the scientific success. Please, dear professor, allow
me to state here, that my approach is a little bit different. I dare
to pose the question, if we still speak of the same goals when we
speak of goodness, wealth and well-being as our forefathers in the
19th Century mentioned. Further it is doubtful, that we
speak of the same clients for these mental and physical goods. To
achieve the good requires a definition of the good and a definition
of the beneficiary. From your text, I read that you agree with me,
that these terms are as poorly defined as in times of Socrates.
Right? Deducing from this, could we say that philosophy remained
behind natural science? But, if philosophy is not following the path
and rhythm of science, how can we be sure that there is a progress at
all? In my view, both are interrelated. As I understand, you share
this opinion. Would this require new advancement in metaphysics or is
there another approach to it?
In the following chapter, “Science
and power”, you discuss the relation between knowledge and
understanding versus the application of knowledge and limits of
liberty in the physical, material world. There is a book of Jürgen
Habermas who treats this issue from the philosophical point of view
“Justification and Application” [ CITATION Hab941 \l 2055 ].
Further, in chapter “Science and Democracy” you make application
concrete in setting it into the context of democratic consensus
building comparing it with truth statements in science. This bridges
directly with the next chapter “Science and Development” where
you define scientific progress as an emancipatory act for the gain of
power towards a general goal of more freedom and happiness. You
mention that if this holds true it must “spin continuously to keep
from falling” and science, perhaps even societal structures,
convert or degrade into “pure will of power”. This is a very
interesting point of your paper. So far, I can follow all your points
and agree with you totally. This leads me to the same conclusion.
From your text, however, I get the feeling that “pure will of
power” is not what we want. Points of view very much align with
common sense. I have nothing to remark on this. But, what else, if
not power, can we offer to oppose, check, control it? Why should it
be controlled at all? Is there anything that can keep back the
chaotic energy of life, a form of katechon? And what would the result
of such a katechon be? This is the Enlightment project from the early
humanists on, finding reason, perhaps even objective truth, in order
to control passion and cruelty, which lead to the abysses of society.
My question is on what solid ground can we define reason as guaranty
for social peace superior to any other human behaviour? Nowadays,
this is largely discussed, especially from welfare and compassion
theories. I am not very happy with these ideas, but they confirm my
worry, that reason is not all we have in order to solve our daily
problems. From your paper and the reading of Žižek, I fear, that
pure will of reasons, as opposed to “pure will of power”, will
not only hinder scientific progress but individual identity and
social constituency, as well. In “Science and Truth” you show
that behind the search for truth lays the idea of causal
relationships in ontology and the desire for total knowledge as a
mean to correct failures of existences. From the relativist you seem
to take, that there is a possibility for truth being contextual.
Perhaps, the problem becomes understandable when we look at truth not
as a substance but as a function, a function in constituency of the
world out of the chaos. Birth and death, at the end, are always
beyond our control and time or truth are functions, measurements
which make things meaningful for US, not as a universal category but
as individual existence. If truth is a function, than the problem of
“truth without finding its meaning” you pose in “Science and
Universatlity” becomes a new angle. Truth without meaning, simply
is not truth BECAUSE it is not bridging the “calculated thought”
with the “meditative thought”.
I work on this question currently in
my paper “Sophia and Polemos”, a meditation on the logic and
geometry of metaphysics, which I attach to this document. It was
originally written in German and translated several times. The
translations are not as good as I want them and the paper evolves
through translations. Semantical limitations of linguistic context,
claim for higher order category and give a special dynamic to this
work.
Sciences et humanités: Des Jambes a articular (2008)
In this paper in French language you
speak about the “maillage fin” and the ideal world (Le mond
ideal). You mention humanity as reactionnairs and their problem with
alienation (L’étrangeté de la science). This idea is very
familiar in marxist and some development theories like the works of
Manfred Max-Neef [ CITATION Max91 \l 2055 ].
With the term “ontology of
actuality” (ontologie d’actualité) you directly address a
problem that also Žižek worries about throughout all his work, that
Khora, the point of view or the point of relation, is not to be
understood as a definition or a limitation of a term, but rather as a
function of measuring intervals, the background against which reality
can be contrasted. Khora as such is rather imagination than
demoralization or metrication (definition of the time-space
continuum). It is imagination, the power to act spontaneously, as
expressed in its Indo-Germanic root “magh-“, the violent, always
disruptive “power to synthetize” of the subject [CITATION Žiž99 \p 48 \l 2055 ].
Actuality, requires thus, the distinctive measurement of today
contrasted from eternity as a memory of yesterday and a potentiality
of tomorrow [CITATION Žiž99 \p 62 \l 2055 ]. Where Žižek tries to
link the phenomenon with the noumenon, Julia
Kristeva speaks of the emancipatory activity of semiotics that frees
us from a too restricted symbolic realm of language [ CITATION Kri69 \l 2055 ].
How the limit of restricted and “too restricted” shall be draws,
is not understandable to me in here writings. The question, I
investigate in my research is, if there is a substantial difference
between libertarian and communitarian solutions in politics. Your
question, if science is not the experiment of
philosophy and perhaps philosophy, inspired by scientific failure and
success in such an experiment, the test of it or if science is rather
a test of philosophy seems attractive to me. Isn’t this the age old
question about matter and mind, that become a new importance through
quantum sciences and puts science and philosophy equally on test? As
such, I believe value is neither objective nor relative but it is a
combination of knowledge (appearances concretized) and meaning
(identity as defined in relation to the subject). You speak about
human beings as metaphysical beings, I would add, that all beings
(all subjects) are metaphysic beings and the “Saci” is part of
the entire ontology of the world as co-creation, rather than
creation.
Une nouvelle prévue du caractère quantique du monde (2010)
Here, you articulate the concept of
superposition of two states (superposition de deux etats). The idea
of measurement as an “active operation”, which you already
mentioned in the first paper “New Questions of Science”, is
largely explained. Spontaneously, I remember how in history of
science and history of philosophy the point of reference changes
itself. Early on, the centre of human life started with God in
prehistory, developed towards the planet earth and human beings as
central in human creation, no longer the “universe” but just part
of it, up to Keppler. With Galileo the centre itself moves towards
our star, the sun and in modern time seems to be somewhat the
universe, extended to string theoretical dimensions in the hypothesis
of theoretical physics, astronomy and cosmology. What will the centre
be once these theories are “proofed” right or wrong? What is the
“centre” in quantum theory? Can it make sense to us that the
world changes because someone measures it? Who started measuring
first? Is there a God-like “super-measurer”? And would this not
bring us back to “pure will of power” or “pure will of
measuring”? These questions of polycentric power and decision
making are also interesting in the light of pluralistic polity which
developed in 19th Century Switzerland.
“Le temps exist-il” (2006)
In my paper “Sophia and Polemos”
I try to imagine time as a function of the process of life based on
the geometry of an electron orbitsphere.
This idea I find very much reflected
in your remarks that we have to be careful not to confuse the object
with its function. You propose to think time without words. This
inspired me to give a try in the power point “Le Temps” you find
attached here. My current definition for time is: The observation of
change of states within a defined space from one point of reference
is time. Without distinction of a space there is no time, without
distinction of change there is no time, but without memory of a state
different from the state observed in the actuality there is no time
neither. This brings me to the very unsatisfying problem, that time
is not only related to space, a point of reference and a subject that
measures, but also to the capacity of memory.
We have four variables that are
dependent on each other. None of them can be determined in objective
terms: Time (function), Space (substance?), Subject (substance?),
Memory (function). Honestly, I am not sure if any of those variables
should be defined as substance or function or both are qualia of all
of them. How can we make valid and meaningful expressions from these
variables? Can you be sure that we “ne pouvoir
pas modifier le passé”. Is God God if he/she cannot control
time, i.e. modify the past? I played a little bit with your statement
that the “combinasion de temps cyclique et linéair c’est
linéair”. I dare to challenge your statement and feel like saying:
“no, it’s spherical! Is it? Perhaps, your larger experience in
mathematics and geometrics can help me further with this question.
Conclusions
This is only a short brain
strorming, not a real paper. I hope, some of the ideas are inspiring
to you. As you can take from my CV, I study in an University with
liberal orientation in the tradition of the Austrian School
(Scholastic, Franz von Brentano, Carl Menger, Mises, Hayek, etc.).
Often, I cite communitarian or Marxist theorists like Žižek,
Badiou, Kropotkin. My research is not only based on Hoppe but also on
the Frankfurt School (Habermas) and the early phenomenologist
(Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas). Recently, I defended even ideas of
Marshall – and was almost crucified for it, smile. You may have
your own favourites. I hope this is no inconvenient for you. I am not
following a school but rather a question like a dog strives for a
scent of bone. I am most interested in finding answers and to play
with ideas. It would be a great pleasure, to follow your line of
investigation.
Best regards.
Tabea Hirzel
Zurich, July 25, 2011.
References
Habermas, J. (1994). Justification and Application: Remarks on
Discourse Ethics. Cronin Publisher: The MIT Press.
Kristeva, J. (1969). Séméiôtiké:
recherches pour une sémanalyse.
Paris: Edition du Seuil.
Max-Neef, M. A. (1991). Human Scale Development. Abgerufen am
24. July 2011 von The Apex Press, London:
http://www.max-neef.cl/download/Max-neef_Human_Scale_development.pdf
Žižek, S. (1999). Die Tücke des Subjekts (orig.: The Ticklish
Subject. The Absent Center of Political Ontology). Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp.
